







The aim of this paper is to analyse the e¤ect of income inequality on long-
run economic growth when it is driven by endogenous technological advance. The
model employed emphasises the strategic interactions between competing …rms in
the product market and indivisibility which characterises many high-tech goods.
Widening inequality is harmful for growth in a monopoly but bene…cial in a Bertrand
duopoly, giving a V-shaped relationship between growth and inequality. This also
implies that the growth rate is not necessarily higher in a concentrated market
structure than in a less concentrated one.
JEL Classi…cation: L10, O15, O30, O41.
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The aim of this paper is to analyse the e¤ect of income inequality on long-run economic
growth when it is driven by endogenous technological advance. The model employed
emphasises the strategic interactions between competing …rms in the product market and
indivisibility which characterises many high-tech goods such as computers. Our model
relies on two key traits: (i) income inequality determines the qualities demanded of goods,
and (ii) the demand for quality and price competition among …rms determines the pro…t
incentive for their R&D e¤orts to improve product quality and hence growth. Therefore,
the present model shares the feature of the so-called Schumpeterian growth models that
pro…ts drive R&D, but additionally considers the link between income inequality and
pro…ts.
The importance of this analysis is three-fold. First, there is a common trend among
developed economies that income inequality has risen dramatically in recent decades. For
example, the Gini coe¢cient of household income inequality increased by 10 percentage
points between 1977 and 1991 in the UKand by three and a half percentage point in the US
(Atkinson, 1997). Second, expenditure on R&D is empirically con…rmed to have a positive
impact on productivity growth (see, for example, Griliches, 1986), and it has become
increasingly important in raising our standard of living.1Third, despite these observations,
the literature on inequality and growth predominantly focuses on liquidity constraints,
political and other issues to study a connection between equity and e¢ciency in a dynamic
context. When growth is driven by technological innovations, strategic interactions of
…rms in the product market following a success in research crucially determine the pro…t
incentive for R&D and hence growth. This potential channel through which inequality
1R&D intensity (the ratio of R&D expenditure to sectoral production) is often taken as a measure
of the technological sophistication of an industry, and its steady increase is commonly observed among
developed economies. According to OECD (1996), the average R&D intensity of manufacturing industry
between 1978 and 1980 stood at 1.68% in the UK, 1.72% in Sweden and 2.2% in the US. It increased
to 2.5%, 3.2% and 3.15% between 1990 and 1992. The OECD average has risen from 1.19% to 1.98%
between two periods.
1a¤ects growth remains relatively unexplored.
Our starting point is the so-called “quality-ladders” growth model of Aghion and
Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991), in which pro…t-seeking R&D improves
the quality of products. As higher quality products replace lower quality goods, the
standard of living in the economy improves over time. However, due to the assumption of
consumers’ homothetic preferences, the growth rate is independent of income distribution
in those models.
To overcome this problem, we stress indivisibility of consumption goods which is par-
ticularly appropriate for modern high-tech products. This is consistent with Lancaster
(1980) who argues that vertical product di¤erentiation of consumption goods becomes
most relevant when they are indivisible and consumers di¤er in their income. Once indi-
visibility is assumed, consumer preferences are no longer homothetic, and inequality comes
to have an impact on growth through a product market, since the degree of inequality en-
dogenously determines the number of price-competing …rms with positive market shares.
In the Industrial Organisation literature, the same assumption is used in the static price
competition models of Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Shaked and Sutton (1982).
Therefore, the present paper combines the standard endogenous growth model and the
IO model on price competition in vertically di¤erentiated markets. An additional gain
from this exercise is a richer realism. In the benchmark “quality-ladders” models, only the
top-quality products are consumed (or used if they are inputs). This aspect does not …t
reality where, for example, computers with inferior microprocessors are on demand along
with superior ones. In our mode, in contrast, some consumers purchase inferior quality
products simply because they cannot a¤ord superior ones.
The key results of this study are as follows. (i) When the degree of inequality is rela-
tively small, a monopoly endogenously arises in the product market. In this circumstance,
as inequality exogenously widens, the value of innovation (an R&D incentive) drops and
the growth rate falls. (ii) When the degree of inequality is relatively large, on the other
2hand, the product market is characterised by Bertrand duopoly. Widening inequality
raises the value of innovation and hence the growth rate. This suggests that the growth
rate has a V-shaped relationship with inequality. The intuition is as follows. The question
of how inequality a¤ects growth in our model boils down to the link between inequality
and a pro…t incentive for R&D. Widening inequality intensi…es competition in the form
of increased entry threat, thereby reducing pro…ts, in a monopoly, but relaxes it in a
duopoly, generating higher pro…ts. The V-shaped relation also implies that the intensity
of innovative activity is not necessarily higher in a concentrated market and can be higher
in a less concentrated market. This …nding is consistent with empirical studies of Geroski
(1990) and Blundel, et al. (1995), who show a negative link between growth and the
degree of a market concentration.
It is only recently that attention has started to be paid to the product market as
a potential channel through which inequality a¤ects growth. Closest to our study is
Zweimüller and Brunner (1996) who independently develop a similar framework. They
show that inequality is always harmful for growth. However, this result is obtained due
to the assumption that there are three groups of consumers in terms of wealth (i.e. rich,
middle-income and poor), in each of which the number of consumers is …xed. A conse-
quence is that when di¤erent quality products are consumed, the demand for each product
is not a¤ected by price changes for a given market structure. It seems unnecessarily re-
strictive for modelling strategic interactions of …rms when the market is oligopolistic.
Once this assumption is relaxed, as we do in the present paper, the V-shaped relation
emerges. A similar result is reported in Glass (1996). But, due to homothetic preferences
of consumers and divisibility of quality goods, she has to assume that consumers’ subjec-
tive evaluation of the quality level di¤ers between the rich and the poor. It is this extra
assumption that makes them purchase di¤erent quality goods and income distribution
matter for growth in her model. If consumers place the same evaluation on quality goods,
growth becomes independent of the income inequality. Gar´ cia-Peñalosa (1995) also con-
3siders the equity-e¢ciency link within the Schumpeterian framework. But her analysis
focuses on the credit market rather than the product market.
Other studies in the literature highlight di¤erent potential channels other than the
product market. Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Bénabou (1996), Bertola (1993), Glomm
and Ravikumar (1992), Perotti (1993), Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Saint-Paul and
Verdier (1993) develop models with endogenous …scal policy through voting. Since tax-
ation is distortionary, it adversely a¤ects investment and growth. Imperfection of the
capital market is stressed by Bénabou (1996), Galor and Zeira (1993), Garía-Peñalosa
(1995). Since some agents are credit-constrained, productive activities are adversely af-
fected. Benhabib and Rustichini (1991) and Krussel and Rios-Rull (1996) focus on the
redistribution between social groups with di¤erent interests. Expropriative activities cre-
ate the disincentive for investment and hence discourages growth. Galor and Tsiddon
(1997) focus on the parental externality in the formation of human capital. In a di¤erent
context, Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) consider the interactions between the income
distribution and demand externality to examine their e¤ect on industrialisation. Although
this list is by no means exhaustive for the vast literature, many of the theoretical models
predict that inequality is harmful for growth. Among the above-cited studies, however,
Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), Gar´ cia-Peñalosa (1995) and Perotti (1993) demonstrate
that inequality can be bene…cial for growth in some circumstances. In this sense, the
conclusion of our study is similar to theirs. But the mechanism behind our V-shaped
result is di¤erent from theirs.
The plan of our paper is as follows. In Section 2, we …rst explain the source of
inequality and examine consumers’ utility maximisation in the presence of indivisibility
of goods. On the basis of this, we turn to the supply side, in which the product market
is characterised by monopoly and Bertrand duopoly. Section 3 examines the steady state
equilibrium of the two cases and analyses the e¤ect of widening inequality on growth.
Some recent empirical evidence is also brie‡y discussed there. Conclusions are given in




The economy is populated by L consumers who live in…nitely. They supply one unit of ‡ow
labour service without its disutility in each period. To introduce inequality, consumers
are assumed to di¤er in labour e¢ciency denoted by h: It is assumed to be uniformly
distributed between h and h; 0 < h < h; with the density of ¾h = L=(h ¡ h): This is
represented by a solid schedule in Figure 1. Now de…ne h¤ as the average labour e¢ciency,
so that
h = h
¤ + z; h = h
¤ ¡ z (1)
where z is a measure of dispersion. This enables us to rewrite the density as ¾h = L=2z: An
increase in z means more income inequality in our model, since consumers are remunerated
accordingto labour e¢ciency. Thus, we are interested in the e¤ect on growth of an increase
in z: Such a mean-preserving spread is illustrated by the movement from the solid schedule
to the dotted one in Figure 1.
5There are two types of …nal goods in the economy. One group of products, indexed
by j, j 2 [0;1]; are subject to quality innovation over time. Consumers consume a single
unit of those quality products in each period. The other good is a homogenous product,
denoted by x; which is a numeraire.













lnqnt(j)dj + lnxt (3)
where qn is the quality index de…ned as
qnt(j) = °
n(t;j); ° > 1; n(t;j) = 0;1;2;:::: (4)
In (4), ° represents the increase in quality from each innovation and n(t;j) is the cumu-
lative number of innovations in the jth industry up to time t. We use N to denote the
highest number of innovation achieved at time t; so that qNt(j) is the state-of-the-art,
qN¡1t(j) the second highest on the quality ladder and so on.
The ‡ow budget constraint of consumers with e¢ciency h is kh
t+1 = hwt ¡ Eh
t +
(1 + rt)kh
t where wt is a wage per unit e¢ciency, rt is an interest rate, Eh
t is expenditure
and kh
t is an asset holding. After purchasing a single unit of quality products, consumers
spend the remaining income on the homogenous products. Hence a utility-maximizing





t ¡ Pnt (5)
where Pnt =
R 1
0 pnt(j)dj and pnt(j) is the price of quality products.
Given the utility function and the budget constraint, consumers choose fEh
t g1
t=0. Once
they optimally determine expenditure, the choice of qnt(j) is made simultaneously along
with the decisions on pnt(j) by pro…t-maximising …rms. Hence, setting aside the choice
6of quality on the part of consumers for a moment, we …rst consider the optimal choice of
expenditure. Since Eh
t and xh
t are linearly related due to (5), the choice of Eh
t is equivalent
to choosing xh
t for a given Pnt. So, we let consumers maximize (2) subject to the ‡ow
budget constraint by choosing xh









Since the distribution of expenditure is important for the following analysis, we estab-
lish the following lemma.
Lemma 1 If consumers have the same initial asset holding (i.e., kh
0 = k0 > 0)2and
consume the state-of-the-art products for all j’s (i.e., a monopoly), then their expenditure
is linearly and positively related to their labour e¢ciency, so that expenditure is uniformly
distributed for any sequence of fwt;rt;PNtg1
t=0.
Proof: See Appendix A.
We also analyse a duopoly market structure. In this case, as will become clear, the
state-of-the-art and second highest quality products are consumed.
Lemma 2 Suppose that the initial asset holding is the same for all consumers. If there
is a unique threshold expenditure level which divides consumers into two groups such that
one group consume qNt and the other purchase qN¡1t for all j’s (i.e., duopoly), then
consumers’ expenditure is linearly and positively related to their labour e¢ciency, so that
expenditure is uniformly distributed for any sequence of fwt;rt;PNt;PN¡1tg1
t=0.
Proof: It is evident from applying Lemma 1 to each group of consumers.
The two lemmas imply that the population density can be rewritten in terms of ex-
penditure as ¾Et = L=(Et¡Et) where Et and Et are the highest and lowest expenditures
and correspond to h and h respectively. In the following section, it proves convenient
2This assumption removes any other source of inequality apart from e¢ciency di¤erences.
7to use consumers’ expenditure rather than labour e¢ciency to describe the supply side
of the model. But readers may …nd it helpful to bear in mind that E has a one-to-one
correspondence with h:
2.2 Quality Goods Industry: Monopoly3
Since all quality industries are assumed to be identical in every respect, we focus upon
one representative quality industry, dropping the argument j. The degree of inequality
plays a crucial role in determining the market structure. Thus, for the time being, we
suppose that the distribution of consumers’ e¢ciency is such that only the state-of-the-art
products are consumed.
2.2.1 Production
It is assumed that producing a unit of quality products requires c > 0 units of labour
e¢ciency. When a monopoly prevails in a market, the best response of other …rms is
marginal cost pricing, i.e. pn = wc; n = 0;1;:::;N ¡ 1: It follows that the monopoly
market arises if EN · E where EN is the expenditure of threshold consumers who are
indi¤erent between qN and qN¡1: A threshold expenditure EN is derived from equating
the static utility (3) in each period of consuming qN to that of consuming qN¡1, i.e.
R 1
0 lnqNdj + ln(EN ¡ PN) =
R 1
0 lnqN¡1dj + ln(EN ¡ PN¡1): Since pN(j) = pN; this leads
to4




Given this, one can easily establish the following lemma:
3To avoid an excessive notation, we drop the time subscripts in what follows unless it causes ambiguity.
4We have assumed that all consumers buy one unit of quality goods. But if c is su¢ciently small, all
consumers always choose to consume a quality product. To show this, consider the poorest consumers. If
they buy qn; n = 1;2;:::N; their utility level is
R 1
0 lnqndj+ln(E¡Pn); while they can attain lnE without
consuming it. All consumers purchase quality goods if and only if
R 1
0 lnqndj + ln(E ¡ Pn) > lnE: But,
since pn = wc for n = 1;2;:::N ¡ 1 for a monopoly, the poorest consumers buy qN or qN¡1 if they are





0 (Nj ¡ 1)dj depending on whether qN or qN¡1 is purchased. This inequality
holds if c is su¢ciently small:











(E ¡ wc): (8)
Proof. Monopoly pro…ts are L(pN ¡ wc): Since L is given, pro…t maximisation implies
that a monopoly …rm chooses the highest price such that EN · E: This inequality and
pN¡1 = wc imply pN · (E ¡ wc)=¡ + wc: Hence we obtain pM




A monopoly price depends upon E; since it is a limit-price such that EN = E; i.e. a
monopoly …rm serves the whole market.5As the poorest consumers become poorer (i.e.
h and E fall), pM
N and ¼M
N decrease. This leads to a drop in the incentive for R&D and
discourages growth, as we will see.
2.2.2 When a Monopoly Arises?
The demand schedule facing the monopolist can be written as ¾E(E ¡ EN) where EN
is de…ned by (7). Since it is linear in pN and a marginal cost is constant, a monopolist
chooses output which is the half of the output he would obtain under marginal cost
pricing, i.e. ¾E(E ¡ wc)=2. Thus, a monopoly arises if L · ¾E(E ¡ wc)=2, which leads






R&D is conducted in every period and its outcome is realised at the beginning of each
period. We assume that in each period nature picks up one successful entrepreneur at
most or no innovation occurs. More precisely, for an entrepreneur k conducting »k units
5Having reached this point, the readers may have realised that Lemma 3 is robust to any distribution
of labour e¢ciency, since the poorest consumers’ expenditure only matters. Thus, a uniform distribution
of labour e¢ciency is virtually redundant. But we have assumed it to maintain consistency with the next
section of duopoly in which this assumption becomes important.
9of R&D, the probability of succeeding in his R&D is ¥k = »




and ¹ > 0. Thus, de…ning ¥t =
P
k ¥k
t; a single innovation occurs in an industry with a
probability of




or no innovation occurs with a complementary probability of 1 ¡ ¥: A parameter ¹ is
interpreted as di¢culties which cannot be overcome even if all resources are devoted to
R&D.
A successful entrepreneur starts selling his products from the period when innovation
occurs. If he succeeds in R&D at the tth period, he achieves the value of his innovation
V M









where µt = 1 and µm =
Qm
i=t(1 ¡ ¥i)=(1 + ri) for m ¸ t + 1. The innovator earns
pro…ts in the tth period with certainty. But, from the next period on, there is always a
positive probability of the …rm being displaced. Hence pro…ts earned after period t + 1
are discounted using the “e¤ective” cumulative discount factor µm: Equation (11) is also
interpreted as the “no-arbitrage” condition which ensures that consumers are indi¤erent
between bonds and equities of research …rms as a means of saving, and the interest rate
rt is determined in the competitive …nancial market (see Grossman and Helpman (1991)).
It is assumed that one unit of R&D requires a > 0 e¢ciency units of labour services.
Thus, free entry in R&D leads to
V
M = wa(¹ + ») for » > 0: (12)
So far, we have implicitly assumed that an incumbent …rm does not conduct R&D to
improve its own product. This is due to what is called the replacement e¤ect, i.e. an
incremental gain for an incumbent from an extra innovation is strictly smaller than the
gain for outside …rms. For simplicity, we continue to assume this throughout the paper.6
6For a model in which incumbent …rms conduct R&D, see Ulph (1991), who analyses the relation
102.3 Quality Goods Industry: Bertrand Duopoly
2.3.1 Production
As before, we start by supposing that the degree of inequality is such that only the
two highest quality products are consumed. Consider consumers who are indi¤erent
between qN and qN¡1. They are characterised by (7). Note that EN is unique given
pN and pN¡1: consumers with expenditure larger than EN buy the qN products and
others consume the qN¡1 goods. Since consumers are divided into two distinct groups,
Lemma 2 now applies and duopoly pro…ts are given by ¼N = ¾E(E ¡EN)(pN ¡ wc) and
¼N¡1 = ¾E(EN ¡ E)(pN¡1 ¡ wc): Simultaneously solving these two equations, we can
establish the following lemma:
Lemma 4 The Bertrand prices fpB
N; pB












































Proof. See Appendix B.
Note that duopoly prices are increasing in E and decreasing in E: This contrasts with
a monopoly price in (8) which is independent of E and increasing in E. As a result,
duopoly and monopoly pro…ts change di¤erently as the distribution of expenditure alters.
As we will see, these di¤erences give rise to the V-shaped relation between inequality and
growth in our model.
2.3.2 When a Duopoly Arises?
If the two top …rms are only to have positive market shares, the best response of producers
of quality lower than qN¡1 is marginal cost pricing, i.e. pn = wc; n = 0;1;:::;N ¡2: Thus,
between growth and industrial structure.
11duopoly requires EN¡1 · E where EN¡1 is the expenditure of the consumers indi¤erent
between qN¡1 and qN¡2. Invoking the same logic used in deriving (7), we can write
EN¡1 = ¡pN¡1 ¡ (¡ ¡ 1)wc. Using this and the second equation of (13), EN¡1 · E is
rearranged to yield (E ¡ wc)=(E ¡ wc) · 2 + 3=°. As long as this inequality holds, at
most two top …rms have positive market shares for equilibrium prices (13). An intuition
is that Bertrand equilibrium prices are so low that consumers purchase products of either
qN or qN¡1 and other goods are not consumed. On the other hand, as (E ¡wc)=(E ¡wc)
approaches 2 from above, the demand for the qN¡1 products fall to zero. Therefore, the














Turning to the value of innovation which occurs in the tth period, V B























i=t(1 ¡ ¥i)=(1 + ri) with µt = 1; µs =
Qs
l=m+2(1 ¡ ¥l)=(1 + rl) and ±m+1 =
¥m+1=(1 + rm+1): First consider pro…ts arising from the production of the top-quality
products. Just like V M; the expected discounted value of those pro…ts is obtained by
multiplying ¼B
Nm by the “e¤ective” cumulative discount factor µm; and its sum is given
by the …rst term on the RHS of (16). The second term represents the value of innovation
arising from producing the second-highest goods on the quality ladder. In (17), ¡m+1 is the
sum of the expected values of pro…ts due to producing those goods which are discounted
12back to the (m + 1)th period. Viewed from the mth period when ¼B
Nm is still earned,
its expected discounted value is ±m+1¡m+1; and hence µm±m+1¡m+1 is its expected value
discounted back to the tth period. Summing it over m gives the second term on the RHS
of (16). Free entry in R&D leads to
V
B = wa(¹ + ») for » > 0: (18)
2.4 Homogeneous Goods








; 0 < ® < 1; l = M;B (19)
where Ll
x is the labour force employed in e¢ciency units. In this sector, perfect competi-
tion prevails and hence the labour demand is given by Ll
x = ®Xl=w:
2.5 Labour Market
There are three sources of labour demand: R&D and manufacturing of quality and ho-
mogeneous products. Full employment requires




¤L; l = M;B: (20)
where Xl =
R E
E ¾Ex(Eh)dEh and x(Eh) is given by (5). For (20) to make sense, we require
h¤ > c.
2.6 Growth Rate
In the present model, there is neither physical capital accumulation or productivity im-
provement. But consumers become better-o¤ over time due to quality improvement of
consumption goods. The steady-state growth rate of individual utility is calculated as
follows:








dj = ¥(»)ln° (21)
13where e n is N or N ¡ 1 depending upon the market structure and labour e¢ciency with
which consumers are endowed. The integral term is due to technological innovation in the
quality goods market. If innovation occurs in a product line j, the utility gain is ln°dj,
and it is 0 otherwise. Since we have a continuum of industries, the Law of Large Numbers
applies. That is, the fraction of industries with innovations occurring in each period is
¥(»), leading to the second equality in (21). The growth rate of consumer utility g is
strictly increasing in », although its level di¤ers depending upon consumers’ e¢ciency
endowment.
3 Steady-State Equilibrium
In this section, we focus upon a steady-state equilibrium. Setting wt = w; Eh
t = Eh
and Pt = P, consumers’ intertemporal budget constraint becomes Eh = wh + ½k0.7Next
de…ne E¤ = wh¤ + ½k0 as the average consumer expenditure. Then, subtracting it from
the extreme expenditures E and E and making use of (1), we obtain
E ¡ wc
w
= ! + z ¡ c;
E ¡ wc
w










First let us consider the range of ! consistent with a monopoly in a steady state. Rewriting
(9) gives
3z + c · !: (24)
7This equation can be obtained from (29) in Appendix A by imposing wt = w; Eh
t = Eh and Pt = P:
14The steady state equilibrium in the case of a monopoly is analysed by rewriting the two
equations (11) and (20) as













¤ ¡ (1 ¡ ®)c]L; (LM)
where ¦M
N (´ ¼M
N =w) = L(! ¡ z ¡ c)=¡: Equation (V M) is the equilibrium condition in
the R&D sector and (LM) is the full-employment condition in the factor market. They
constitute the system of the two equations with two unknowns » and !:
The right-hand side of (V M) is the value of innovation. It is decreasing in », since
a higher » implies, on average, a shorter period during which a product remains the
state-of-the-art. The left-hand side of (V M) represents research costs. It is increasing in
». A greater total R&D in the jth industry reduces the probability that an individual
entrepreneur succeeds in R&D in that sector, raising R&D cost for a given probability of
her success.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique equilibrium in which the economy grows with a
positive growth rate when a monopoly operates in the quality goods market.
Proof: See Appendix C.
What this proposition demonstrates is shown in Figure 2 in which the V MV M and
LMLM schedules represent (V M) and (LM) respectively. They are monotonic, so that
they intersect at a unique equilibrium labelled A for the range of (24).
We are interested in the impact on » of exogenously raising the degree of inequality.
As explained before, this is done by increasing z; i.e. the mean-preserving spread of labour
e¢ciency which will make the income distribution more unequal.
Proposition 2 When the quality goods market is characterised by a monopoly, increasing
inequality (a higher z) leads to a lower growth rate.
15Figure 2: Monopoly: inequality is harmful for growth.
Proof: See Appendix D.
The intuition for this proposition is as follows. Given the monopoly market structure,
changes in z do not alter the …rm’s total demand. Their e¤ect comes only through prices.
A monopolist uses limit-pricing to ensure that the whole market is captured and lower
quality goods are not consumed. But, as inequality widens, poor consumers become
poorer and …nd the qN¡1 products which are priced at marginal cost more attractive.
This tends to make the entry of the …rm producing them easier, i.e. the threat of entry
increases or competition intensi…es. In order to persuade those consumers to continue
to buy state-of-the-art goods, the monopolist reduces his limit price, decreasing pro…ts.
Note that widening inequality is equivalent to intensifying competition in monopoly.
As pro…t rates fall, the incentive for R&D diminishes. This reduces » for a given !,
shifting the V MV M schedule leftward in Figure 2. On the other hand, a fall in pM
N raises
the demand for homogenous products, boosting the labour demand in that sector. As
upward-pressure on wages builds up in the homogeneous goods sector, it attracts labour
from R&D. This decreases » for a given !, moving LMLM curve leftward. The net e¤ect
is a movement of the equilibrium from A to A0 with an unambiguous drop in »:
163.2 Bertrand Duopoly
We …rst derive the range of ! consistent with Bertrand duopoly from (15):
3(° + 1)
° + 3
z + c · ! < 3z + c: (25)
The equilibrium conditions are now derived from (16) and (20):























¤ ¡ (1 ¡ ®)c]L (LB)
where ¦B
N (´ ¼B
N=w) = (L=2z)(! + 3z ¡ c)2=9¡ and ¦B
N¡1 (´ ¼B
N¡1=w) = (L=2z)(3z ¡
! + c)2=9(¡ ¡ 1): Conditions (V B) and (LB) are for equilibrium in the R&D sector and
the labour market respectively.
The right-hand side of (V B) is the value of innovation. A term ¦B
N represents pro…ts
which are earned as long as the product remains the state-of-the-art. Once its quality is
improved upon, those pro…ts are lost. Its expected present value is decreasing in » just as
in a monopoly. Now consider ¦B
N¡1 which accrues to an innovator as long as her product
is the second highest on the quality ladder. Its expected present value is decreasing in » if
½ < ¥(») but increasing for ½ > ¥(»). This picks up two opposing e¤ects. The …rst is the
same as above: a higher » makes the period of earning ¦B
N¡1 shorter on average, leading
to a negative relation between the expected present value and ». On the other hand, as
» rises, the product becomes the second highest more quickly than otherwise, realising
¦B
N¡1 much earlier in time on average. This tends to increase the expected present value
of ¦B
N¡1.
Proposition 3 There exists a unique equilibrium in which the economy grows with a pos-
itive growth rate when the market for quality goods is characterised by Bertrand duopoly.
Proof: See Appendix E.
17Figure 3: Bertrand duopoly: inequality is bene…cial for growth.
Figure 3 describes what this proposition demonstrates. The monotonic V BV B and
LBLB schedules represent (V B) and (LB) respectively, and their intersection point B
gives a unique equilibrium for the range of (25).
Proposition 4 When the quality product market is characterised by a Bertrand duopoly,
the growth rate rises with the degree of inequality (a higher z).
Proof: See Appendix F.
There are two e¤ects operating. The mean-preserving spread of labour e¢ciency
implies that the rich become richer and the poor become poorer. The former …nd qN
more appealing and the latter see qN¡1 as more attractive. That is, wider inequality
reinforces the tendency that consumers with higher labour e¢ciency purchase higher
quality products and lower-e¢ciency consumers buy lower quality products. This makes
it easier for duopolists to segment the market into two, and as a result, price competition
does not need to be as intensive as before, giving them scope to increase their prices.8This
competition-easing e¤ect tends to raise their pro…ts. It is true that a higher z helps to
8An alternative explanation is that for the both qualities, the price elasticity of demand decreases
with the degree of inequality, so that their prices become higher.
18Figure 4: Changes in the composition of the total demand.
ease the entry of the qN¡2 …rm, but it has little impact on the …rms’ price decision.9Note
that, in contrast with the monopoly case, widened inequality leads to the relaxation of
competition in Bertrand duopoly.
The second e¤ect is due to changes in the composition of the total demand for quality
products. This is best explained by using Figure 4 where the horizontal and vertical
axes represent expenditure and the population density. The initial consumer distribution
is given by the rectangle associated with E1 and E1. Consumers between EN and E1
purchase the qN product and consumers between E1 and EN buy the qN¡1 product. Note
that EN is always smaller than E¤:10As inequality widens, the distribution becomes wider
with the extreme expenditures moving to E2 and E2. Each of the duopolists, ceteris
paribus, gains the extra demand represented by the areas A1; which is the same for the
both …rms. However, the density ¾E decreases following a rise in z, and this causes the
loss of demand: A2 for the top-quality …rm and A3 for the qN¡1 …rm. Since EN and E¤
do not change and EN < E¤; an area A2 is larger than A3: The net e¤ects are that the
demand for qN falls as A1 < A2; and the demand for qN¡1 rises as A1 > A3:
Because the price and demand of the second highest …rm on the quality ladder increase,
9This e¤ect becomes important for E¡wc
E¡wc > 2 + 3
° (see equation (15)).
10Indeed, EN = [(E ¡ wc) + (E ¡ wc)]=3 + wc and E¤ = [(E ¡ wc) + (E ¡ wc)]=2 + wc:
19Figure 5: The V-shaped relationship between growth and inequality.
its pro…t rates unambiguously rise with the degree of inequality. As for the top-quality
…rm, its price rises whereas its demand shrinks. But the competition-easing e¤ect always
dominates the demand composition e¤ect, pushing up the top …rm’s pro…t rates.
Increased pro…ts lead to a greater incentive for R&D, raising » for a given !: Thus,
the V BV B schedule in Figure 3 shifts rightward. On the other hand, rises in pN and pN¡1
reduce the demand for homogeneous goods and hence the labour demand in that sector.
As wages tend to drop in the homogeneous products sector, more resources are diverted
to R&D. This boosts » for a given !; moving the LBLB schedule rightward. A net e¤ect
is an unambiguous rise in »:
3.3 Discussion
The main implication of the present study is that (i) the growth rate is a function of the
measure of income inequality, i.e. g = f(z); and (ii) this function has a V-shaped form,
as depicted in Figure 5 where z1 is associated with E¡wc
E¡wc = 2 and z2 with E¡wc
E¡wc = 2+3=°;
given other parameters. As we move towards z1 from either points A or B; the degree of
competition increases and the value of innovation falls. Since it reaches the lowest at z1;
we obtain the V-shaped relation between g and z. Thus, whether inequality is bene…cial
20or harmful for the growth of the R&D-driven economy crucially depends upon the market
structure in which innovative …rms compete.
Existing empirical studies on inequality and growth mainly focus on channels other
than the product market. Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994) and
Perotti (1992, 1994) estimate reduced form equations for the models with endogenous …s-
cal policy. Perotti (1994) examines the impact of imperfect capital markets, and Alesina
and Perotti (1996) and Alesina, et al. (1996) analyse the e¤ect of socio-political insta-
bility. Bénabou (1996) also explores similar lines of research. These studies suggest that
inequality is harmful for growth.11However, our model cannot be literally subject to this
evidence, since they typically use investment or growth of physical output as dependent
variables in their estimating equations, whereas in our model real output remains constant
and the growth rate is in terms of consumers’ utility.
In the absence of evidence directly related to the theme of the present paper, most
relevant empirical studies for our purpose are those on the traditional Schumpeterian
hypothesis that larger …rm size and more concentrated market structure are bene…cial for
innovative activities. This literature examines the underlying theoretical structure of the
R&D-based growth model, including ours. As for studies up to the 1980’s, Cohen and
Levin (1989) conclude that evidence is inconclusive on the whole. But more recent studies,
such as Geroski (1990) and Blundel, et al. (1995) present evidence against the hypothesis.
We argue that the present model is consistent with the more recent empirical evidence for
three reasons. First, in the R&D-based models including ours, the incentive for R&D is
anticipated pro…ts. Geroski (1990) shows that this expected pro…t and successful research
output are positively correlated, although he admits some di¢culties in estimating it with
precision.
11Empirically the endogenous policy models predict an inverse relationship between the share of the
third quantile of income distribution and the share of public investment, transfers and education depend-
ing upon models. But, Perotti (1994) shows that such prediction is not supported by the data. Hence, the
predicted negative linkage between inequality and growth are supported in the reduced form estimations,
whereas the evidence does not favour the underlying political process which characterises them.
21Figure 6: The Her…ndahl index.
Second, those empirical studies typically use the market share of a few top-ranking
…rms to measure the concentration of the market structure. In their evidence, successful
research output falls as the market becomes more concentrated. It implies that the growth
rate falls with an increase in the Her…ndahl concentration index, which is de…ned as
H =
Pm
k=1(Sk)2 where m is the number of …rms in an industry and Sk is the kth …rm’s






















Since (E ¡ wc)=(E ¡ wc) is monotonically increasing in z; the right-hand side is strictly
decreasing in z; as depicted in Figure 6. Comparing it with Figure 5 con…rms that
the growth rate falls as the index rises when the market structure is characterised by a
duopoly. Third, the non-monotonic relationship described in Figure 5 predicts that
more vigorous innovative research activity can be observed in a less concentrated market.
To show this, consider two economies at C1 and C2 in Figure 5. Evidently, a monopoly
at C1 is associated with a higher innovative intensity. Next compare the economies at C1
and C3: A higher research intensity is now observed with a duopoly at C3.
It should also be noted that our result depends on a negative link between growth
and competition. This is seen in Figure 6 where the growth rate falls with the degree of
22competition in the product market. But, empirical evidence for this view is not strong.
For example, Nickell (1993) …nds evidence to the contrary, although he admits that it is
not “overwhelming”. But, his study does not directly estimate the e¤ect of competition on
innovative activity, which is the engine of growth in our model. Moreover, his regression
equations use the value of sales or value-added as dependent variables to estimate the
e¤ect of competition on growth of physical output. Arguably these variables do not take
into account quality improvement of products, which increases consumers’ welfare in our
model.
4 Conclusion
There are many potential chains of causality through which the income distribution af-
fects growth. Of these, this paper highlights a relatively unexplored mechanism: income
distribution a¤ects demand for quality products, which in turn determines the pro…t in-
centive for technological innovations and growth. In equilibrium, the market is served by
a monopoly if the income distribution is relatively less dispersed, or two …rms can share
the market, if inequality is relatively large. In a monopoly, all consumers purchase the-
state-of-the-art goods. On the other hand, the rich consume higher quality goods and the
poor purchase lower quality goods in the duopoly case. These equilibrium con…gurations
seem quite plausible even on the basis of casual observation.
The source of the presence of inequality is consumers’ endowment of labour e¢ciency.
To analyse the e¤ect of inequality, we conducted the mean-preserving spread of such
e¢ciency, holding everything else constant. When a monopoly prevails, a wider income
distribution discourages growth because entry threat increases or competition intensi…es.
In contrast, widening inequality relaxes price competition in a duopoly and promotes
growth.
Robustness of this result may be checked by changing strategies taken by compet-
23ing …rms. Obvious candidates are Stackelberg duopoly and collusion.12In a Stackelberg
duopoly, it can be established that the U-shaped relationship still arises, at least when
the size of innovation is relatively small.13When it comes to collusion, widening inequality
proves to be harmful for growth. It is intuitively clear, as collusion can be seen as a multi-
plant monopoly. An additional implication of such an extension is that the growth rate
is also a¤ected by the types of competition strategy adopted by …rms. It can be shown
that the economy grows faster when …rms compete in a Stackelberg fashion than in a
Bertrand duopoly, because pro…t rates and prices are strictly higher in a Stackelberg than
Bertrand duopoly.14This suggests that strategic behaviour may constitute a potentially
important factor which contributes to the divergence of growth rates among economies or
industries.15
Finally, one limitation of the present paper is that analysis is restricted to monopoly
and duopoly. As inequality becomes wider beyond z2 in Figure 5, the relationship between
inequality and growth may become less clear-cut. Besides, our analysis did not consider
the general case of oligopoly. However, we believe that our present study is su¢cient
to shed intriguing light on the possible link between inequality and growth from the
Schumpeterian perspective.
12In Cournot competition, the …rst-order conditions for the duopolists would become linearly dependent
due to a …xed total demand for quality goods. The details of these cases can be obtained from the author
upon request.
13When the size of innovation is su¢ciently large, the growth rate falls as inequality widens.
14The result is not a¤ected by which …rm plays the role of a leader or follower.
15Aghion, Harris and Vickers (1996) examine the similar issue but from a di¤erent perspective.
24Appendixes
In the following appendixes, we use the notations of I = E¡w
w and I =
E¡w
w :
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Applying successive substitution to (6) yields xh
t+¿ = xh
t=R1
¿ (1 + ½)
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t : Eliminating
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t+¿ by using (27) and (1 + rt)kh






































This constitutes the optimal expenditure in the tth period. Note that the terms on the
second line is independent of h. Besides the …rst three terms inside the bracket on the
…rst line are linear in h. Hence Eh
t is linear in h if and only if fEh
t¡¿gt
¿=1 is also linear in h:
To show that this is the case, let us set t = 0 in (29). The last two terms on the …rst line
disappear and other terms are still linear in or independent of h. Thus, Eh
0 is linear in h.
When t = 1, the last term on the …rst line of (29) becomes (1 + r1)Eh
0 with other terms
being linear in or independent of h: Hence Eh




t=0 are linear in h. Moreover, linearity implies that expenditure is
uniformly distributed for t = 0;1;2;:::
B. Proof of Lemma 4
25Maximising ¼N = ¾E(E ¡EN)(pN ¡wc) and ¼N¡1 = ¾E(EN ¡E)(pN¡1 ¡wc) where EN
is de…ned in (7) gives the …rst-order conditions
@¼N
@pN
= 0 : 2¡pN ¡ (¡ ¡ 1)pN¡1 = E + ¡wc; (30)
@¼N¡1
@pN¡1
= 0 : ¡pN ¡ 2(¡ ¡ 1)pN¡1 = E ¡ (¡ ¡ 1)wc: (31)
The second-order conditions are
@¼N
@pN = ¡2¾E¡ < 0 and
@¼N¡1
@pN¡1 = ¡2¾E(¡ ¡ 1) < 0:


























Bertrand duopoly pro…ts (14) are obtained from (13), (32) and (33).
C. Proof of Proposition 1
From (V M) and (LM), we can derive
d!
d»
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
V M
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where ¥0 = ¹=(¹ + »)
2 > 0. They are the slopes of the V MV M and LMLM schedules
in Figure 2. Now de…ne !j
»=0
s ; s = V M; LM; as the values of ! when » = 0 for (V M)









1+½ + ®z + c:
D. Proof of Proposition 2
From (V M) and (LM), we obtain
@»
@z
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
V M
= ¡
L(1 + ½)(¹ + »)(½ + ¥)










implying that the two curves shift leftward in Figure 2, reducing ».
26E. Proof of Proposition 3
From (V B) and (LB), we obtain
@!
@»
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
LB
= ¡
a9¡(¡ ¡ 1)=®¾h 0
B B
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Equations (36) and (37) are the slopes of the LBLB and V BV B curves in Figure 3. Thus,














2 ¡ 3z + c and !j
»=0
LB is implicitly determined in (V B) with » = 0.
F. Proof of Proposition 4
From (V B) and (LB), we obtain
@»
@z
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
V B
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i > 0 (41)
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They show that the two schedules shift rightward in Figure 3, increasing ».
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